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ABSTRACT 
 
Deep learning models are known to solve  classification and 
regression problems by employing a number of epoch and training 
samples on a large dataset with optimal accuracy. However, that 
doesn't mean they are attack-proof or unexposed to vulnerabilities. 
Newly deployed systems particularly on a public environment (i.e 
public networks) are vulnerable  to attacks from various entities. 
Moreover, published research on deep learning systems (Goodfellow et 
al., 2014) have determined a significant number of attacks points and 
a wide array of attack surface that has evidence of exploitation from 
adversarial examples. Successful exploit on these systems could lead 
to critical real world repercussions. For instance, (1) an 
adversarial attack on a self-driving car running a deep reinforcement 
learning system yields a direct misclassification on humans causing 
untoward accidents.(2) a self-driving vehicle misreading a red light 
signal may cause the car to crash to another car (3) 
misclassification of a pedestrian lane as an intersection lane that 
could lead to car crashes. This is just the tip of the iceberg, 
computer vision deployment are not entirely focused on self-driving 
cars but on many other areas as well—that would have definitive 
impact on the real-world. These vulnerabilities must be mitigated at 
an early stage of development. It is imperative to develop and 
implement baseline security standards at a global level prior to 
real-world deployment. 
 
Deep learning algorithms have seen their deployment in multiple 
industries in an upward trajectory and will continue to increase in 
the upcoming years due to the (1) enhancements on learning algorithms 
and tools, (2) improved research by skilled engineers and scientists, 
(3) computing power.  The rise of Deep Learning implementation will 
result to a larger attack surface for adversarial attacks. These 
scenarios embodies the vulnerabilities not just on deep learning but 
on a larger scale—the entire AI ecosystem. This paper will 
demonstrate the methodologies on mitigating adversarial attacks on 
deep learning systems—enhancing robustness to the system. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Adversarial examples have immensely fooled classifiers into 
misclassification of training dataset—adding random noise to the 
input data,single step and multi-step attacks—have evidently made 
their way in compromising deep learning systems. Moreover, targeting 
training examples by perturbing the image identity (i.e,. car is 
misclassified as a dog) are some of the widely published techniques 
in attacking the system. Despite it's high accuracy, these systems 
are vulnerable through a wide range of attack surface that is proven 
to be exploitable. In this paper, we aim to develop an intuition on 
mitigating adversarial examples to further enhance the robustness of 
deep learning systems. A networked deep learning system contains a 
number of entry and exit points to and from the network and must be 
mitigated from the early stages of development or prior to the 
deployment. Empirically, we have found that these entry points 
increases the probability of a successful adversarial attack. We 
propose a vulnerability rating score (probability of a successful 
exploit) for each vulnerability found on a deep learning system and 
set a global standard on mitigating each vulnerability. Furthermore, 
It is important to understand the ambiguous entry points and where 
mitigation must be in place to reduce the risk of adversarial 
examples. Figure 1 shows the base score metrics each CVE, we aim to 
standardized all Machine Learning vulnerabilities and set a base 
score metric for each vuln.  
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 Intuitively, a networked system must have in depth security defenses 
on each attack surface—from the physical layer to the application 
layer. We also propose that deep learning deployment must be designed 
and implemented aligned with the IEEE security and networking 
standards to reduce the risk of exploitation.  
 
1.1​ ​WHITE BOX AND BLACK BOX TECHNIQUES 
 
There are two types of adversarial attacks: white box and blackbox 
techniques. White box based attacks leverages an attacker's knowledge 
of the entire network wherein the attacker has gainful insight of the 
network's architecture (i.e input data, training examples 
hyperparameters and number of layers). Whereas, black box attacks are 
performed wherein an attacker has only partial knowledge of the ML 
system architecture. Concretely, an adversarial attack on a 
self-driving car and facial recognition software on the real world 
can manifest through: (1) A system misclassifying a human face by 
using an infrared adversarial invisible mask that tricks the system 
and leads to unrecognizable face detection (Zhe Zhou et al., 2018). 
(2) misclassification of street signs by printing out adversarially 
constructed image. (3) Targeted classification altered image identity 
wherein the target image is incorrectly identified. These probable 
occurrences have real world implications and can be detrimental to 
the massive deployment of deep learning systems in production 
environment and may even harm humans to a greater extent. 
 
 
 
1.2 NETWORKED DEEP LEARNING SYSTEMS  
 
Intuitively, designers have to take into consideration the variations 
of deep learning implementation: for one a self-driving car—is most 
likely to be networked on a public environment (i.e,. The internet). 
This opens up a ton of opportunities for attackers that increases the 
probability of a successful exploit not just from adversarial 
examples but from different forms of malware. Since the code resides 
on the application layer and hosted locally within the car itself, 
there has to be security measures in place on the physical layer 
which is inside the car. Some important question needs to be answered 
(1) Does perimeter security (i.e,. Firewall) has empirical value on 
deployment? (2) How does endpoint security fit into the equation 
(i.e,. Antivirus) to defend against endpoint attack. (3) There have 
been some known security loopholes on 5G networks (Jover et al., 
2019) which will power self-driving cars internet connection. How 
does this impact the robustness of deep networks? It is quite 
evidenced that deep neural networks will not only be vulnerable to 
adversarial examples but also to a greater extent they are geared 
towards the cybersecurity and network space that allows them to be 
vulnerable to any attack just like a software application which is 
what they are. 
 
 
2 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING DEFENSE 
 
Adversarial training is one of the known methods in mitigating 
adversarial examples—making the network more robust from white hat 
and black hat attacks and is highly considered as the most effective 
way of mitigation (Kurakin et al., 2018). In adversarial training the 
network is being trained to classify images with clean examples and 
perturbed or adversarial examples—allowing a baseline for error 
classification. 
 
 
 
 
From the image shown above, a panda on the left and a gibbon on the 
right. An attacker can add a random noise or a minor perturbation 
that can result into tricking the classifier of categorizing the 
panda as a gibbon. In Adversarial training, we configure the 
classifier as having the best and worst case scenario of image 
classification—we train the model into classifying the image as its 
best case: a panda and a worst case: a gibbon. This is an important 
aspect of training, in which any perturbation can be deflected by 
adversarial training—allowing a more robust system that can resist 
adversarial examples. Furthermore, it has been known that 
adversarially trained models exploited by single step attacks to 
generate adversarial examples are easier to classify as well as for 
undefended model (Goodfellow et al., 2018). Definitively, adversarial 
training not only learns to deflect the attack but also make the 
attack performs at a worse level (Goodfellow et al., 2018). 
 
 
2.1 GENERATING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES 
 
Adversarial example generation can be categorized into (1) single 
step attack where there is only a single gradient computation and (2) 
multi step or iterative attack where there are multiple gradient 
computations iteration. The objective of every adversarial example is 
to have a high error rate on the loss function 
 (Zhou Ren et al., 2018), taking into(Xn rn, ytrue n ; θ) for each image XnL +     
account that the image generated is similar to the image from the 
training example. Furthemore, adding randomization layers on the 
model’s architecture has been found to be successful defense in 
adversarial examples particularly in multi-step iterative attacks, in 
stark contrast to adversarial training where it has evidence of 
having a high success rate in defending single step attacks 
(Goodfellow et al., 2018) 
 
It is important to note that these attacks can be exploited using 
white box and black box techniques and evidently—security against 
white-box attacks is the main goal because of the attackers access 
and knowledge of the system, although black-box security has more 
emphasis in developing a baseline goal for deployed ML models.  
 
Below we list the methods in generating adversarial examples and its 
impact on the network. 
 
 
3 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM​). (Goodfellow et al., 2014b) 
 
FGSM is considered as a single step attack where a single gradient is 
computed to generate the adversarial example. FGSM leverages the 
following formula: 
 
 adv FGSM  = x ε · sign (∇xL(h(x), ytrue)) .x :  +    
 
  
FSGM in white hat based attacks targets perturbation on input data 
therefore resulting into a higher loss based on the same 
backpropagated gradients. It is architected to attack deep learning 
networks by the way the networks learn-gradients. Intuitively, there 
has been some notion that in a black-box setting where an attacker 
does not have full access to the model’s architecture. A 
transferrable attack can be propagated from a trained adversarial 
network that could be transferred to the targeted network 
 
 
4 TRANSFER ADVERSARIAL ATTACK  
 
There has been formal and empirical evidence that adversarial example 
can transfer to more than one model (Papernot et al., 2017). In a 
black box setting (where an attacker does not have full access of the 
model’s architecture) an attacker can train a surrogate model that 
has the same input training examples as the targeted model. This 
leads to a higher probability of successfully exploiting the target 
model using a surrogate model. Furthermore, input data generated from 
one model performing the same task can be transferred to another 
model. Transferring an attack has limitations (Boneh et al., 2017). 
Concretely, it has been proven that transferability of 
model-agnostic perturbations. As we can see from the image below, a 
small perturbation on an input image causes a direct 
misclassification on the training example. 
 
  
5 Single-Step Least-Likely Class Method (Step-LL)​. This variant of 
FGSM introduced by Kurakin et al. (2017a;b) targets the least-likely 
class, , yLL = arg min{h(x)}:    
 
 adv LL = x − ε · sign (∇xL(h(x), yLL)) .x :    
 
6 Iterative Attack (I-FGSM or Iter-LL)​. This method iteratively 
applies the FGSM or Step  times with step-size and projectsL k− L  ≥ /k α  
each step onto the `∞ ball of norm  around x. It uses projected 
gradient descent to solve the maximization in (1). For fixed , 
iterative attacks induce higher error rates than single-step attacks, 
but transfer at lower rates (Kurakin et al., 2017a;b). 
 
 
7 DeepFool​: DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) is an iterative 
attack method which finds the minimal perturbation to cross the 
decision boundary based on the linearization of the classifier at 
each iteration. Any lp-norm can be used with DeepFool, and we choose 
l2-norm for the study in this paper.  
 
 
8 Carlini & Wagner (C&W)​: C&W (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) is a stronger 
iterative attack method proposed recently. It finds the adversarial 
perturbation rn by using an auxiliary variable ωn as rn = 1 2 
(tanh(ωn + 1)) − Xn. (2) Then the loss function optimizes the 
auxiliary variable ωn min ωn ||1 2 (tanh(ωn) + 1) − Xn|| + c · f( 1 2 
(tanh(ωn) + 1)). (3) The function f(·) is defined as f(x) = 
max(Z(x)ytrue − max{Z(x)i : i 6= y true}, −k), (4) where Z(x)i is the 
logits output for class i, and k controls the confidence  
 
 
Figure 5: An example of adversarial eyeglass frame against Face 
Recognition System [67] Kos et al. extended. 
 
 
Test results from  
(Goodfellow et al., 2017). 
 
 
 
  
 
9 CONCLUSION 
 
- It has been found empirically that adversarial examples can 
impact a deep learning convolutional network in 
misclassification of input images. 
- Adversarial examples attack are direct attack on deep learning 
systems on the application layer. Mitigation on different 
layers of the network stack must be adhered to particularly on 
networked systems 
- Adversarial examples are transferable from one model to another 
- Adversarial training is considered as the most effective 
mitigation 
- Standardized code hardening guidelines must be implemented in a 
global scale to reduce the risk of adversarial examples 
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